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Current development of the European gas market uncovers several new opportunities and challenges for 
energy security that developed from big changes in production, transit and supply ways of natural gas to 
Europe. New European gas market model builds on the principles of diversification, the security of supply, 
interconnectivity and liberalization. Realization of the EU Third Energy Package related to a progressive shift 
from long-term oil-linked gas supply contracts and development of alternative gas supply sources and lines, 
as well as the rivalry between already established gas transit lines and the new supply lines present new 
challenges and require transition for the V4 countries. In this article I studied what are the new changes and 
challenges of the transition of V4 countries towards the EU’s energy security? To adjust to transition V4 
countries should build the new infrastructure on the short-term pricing market and the ways how it will be 
funded. If V4 countries want to trade gas with the neighbours and transport most of the Russian gas to Europe, 
they need to invest into reforms of pipelines’ networks or to find other alternatives of diversification in the next 
decades. Returns on investment on a liberalized market with a multitude of competitors will be manageable 
but require serious reforms. The V4 countries will have to enter into the spot markets to efficiently trade gas. 
Available gas hubs in Europe are much smaller, less liquid, and mostly supplied by the same companies as the 
long-term traded gas hubs. This kind of markets is easy to manipulate. Therefore, it is important for the V4 
countries to plan how to coordinate their national energy policies and name EU’s energy targets for the future. 
 
Introduction 
Energy security and power industry are among the most important strategic policies of the EU. Forming a 
common EU energy policy and cross-border cooperation with neighbours at governmental, non-governmental 
and business levels creates a key framework for decision-making and consideration of further development of 
the energy sector. The European Commission in 2014 defined the establishment of the European Energy Union 
as one of its top priorities. Its main target is to give consumers (EU's Member States) secure, sustainable, 
competitive and affordable energy [European Commission Press Release on Energy Union, 2016]. The most 
important challenge in obtaining this goal is to build an open, liquid and competitive European internal energy 
market, permitting the EU to act in its relations with external energy suppliers. In the Energy Union, a 
collaboration of member states with their neighbours when implementing their energy policy has crucial 
significance. Transparency of member states regarding their energy relations with third countries and 
agreement to internal EU market regulations are key requirements for the well-functioning internal energy 
market.  
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The EU needs to make use of its economic and political influence in the world and to protect its networks, 
views and interests on the global energy market. In doing so, the V4 countries as a strategic region of EU's 
energy market must act in a stronger way in order to engage in a more constructive and ambitious dialogue 
with its major energy partners, including Russia. Better global governance of energy markets will lead to a 
more competitive and transparent energy mechanism, for the mutual benefit of all parties. The V4 region is 
placed at the confluence of regional interests of both EU and Russia, and the energy dimension of the EU-
Russia relations influences and orients the action taken in the direction of these four countries. In this article, 
we discuss the challenges and further steps of the transition of V4 countries towards the EU’s energy security 
through the prism of the realization of the EU Third Energy Package and the EU-Russia energy relations. 
 
EU’s new energy policy: Reverse gas flows and new gas interconnectors 
Last decade, the European Union announced adaptation of a new approach in the energy area, aiming at 
confirming its role as a major and unique player in the region. A distinguished step forward in this direction is 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), delegating the EU explicit competences in the field of energy. The 
substantial principles of this Treaty in its energy part are solidarity, responsibility and transparency among all 
Member States in a way to easier the establishment of common European energy policy. The Treaty starts the 
process of Europeanization of the energy policy, considering the creation of a unique EU energy market. This 
should permit the EU to have one voice in its relations with the main energy suppliers and then contribute to 
the transparent and market-based relations between producers, transit countries and the consumers. 
Fast action at national and European level is needed, to provide credible, secure, environmentally sustainable 
and affordable energy for European countries. Achieving these goals seems almost impossible without creating 
close cooperation with the major energy suppliers, among which Russia is an important partner. Nowadays, 
Russia’s main interests in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue [Aalto, 2008a] originate from the country’s needs 
to ensure the security of demand for its energy resources and to innovate its energy sector. The development 
of the Russian energy sector contains vast importation of technologies available in the West. The realization 
of large infrastructure projects secures new extraction, transportation and storage capacities, crucial for 
maintaining Russia’s place on the European energy market. Also, as a supply to big Soviet-type infrastructure, 
the country has an interest in the implementation of energy efficiency measures. While implementing an energy 
policy collated on openminded concerted measures with the EU, Russia adopts a different logic. Hence, the 
diversification of the EU energy supply seems like a sign of mistrust in EU-Russia relations. The EU is looking 
for new energy sources and alternative ways to supply energy to its consumers, which for the decades is seen 
by Russia as the main risk. From Russia’s viewpoint, diversification of energy supply aims additional costs, 
paid by the consumers, and thus lowering the competitiveness in the sector [Shmatko, 2010].  
While Russia is resilient towards the EU’s efforts aimed at diversification of natural gas supply routes, it is 
pushing a number of projects aimed at bringing gas to EU via alternative routes. These projects are not so much 
aiming to increase Russia’s presence on EU natural gas market, but rather to reduce the role of traditional 
transit countries (Ukraine) and therefore increasing additional leverage in the Russia-Ukraine relations. 
Ukraine has the possibility to benefit from changing contracting rules in Europe for initiating gas reverse from 
the West. In November 2012, Ukraine’s major gas company Naftogaz signed an agreement with German RWE 
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creating a legal framework for the possible import of natural gas from Europe [DW, 2014] moreover, this 
agreement would not include obligatory purchase or supply bonds. After, Ukraine started purchasing gas from 
RWE via Poland and later, in 2013, had been testing reverse gas supplies from Hungary and Slovakia [Chłoń, 
2014]. In the first half of 2019 Ukrainian imports of natural gas through Poland, Slovakia and Hungary reached 
more than 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas yearly (bcm/y), which was the highest since the beginning of 
2014 [DG Energy Report, 2019].  
Nonetheless, the introduction of gas reverse to Ukraine from the EU market has some particularities and 
represent some risks. First, due to legal doubts, the reverse probably will be carried out only by the physical 
interconnection of the Ukrainian gas transmission system with the pipelines of neighbouring countries. The 
examinations of the gas reverse with Slovakia discovered that real-time unified rules and data transfer are 
needed to ensure the fairness of virtual gas flows and avoid the legal obstacles with the gas owner - Russian 
Gazprom (shipper-codes that prove the gas origin). In this case, the question of who will invest in new physical 
interconnectors remains unresolved. Second, the plans for new gas deliveries in the V4 region (LNG supplies) 
and gas demand show that it will not be the notable capacity of traded gas there as the region is quite small in 
European scale [DG Energy Report, 2019]. 
The situation may be changed only if shale gas will outflow to this market which is also feasible but not define 
today. Third, there will be no big price difference for traded spot gas and pipeline gas in long-term and for this 
reason, the gas reverse may not become commercially feasible. All the above-mentioned scenarios will be 
available for Ukraine only after integration to common gas market of the EU which also can be a long-lasting 
and difficult path. Reducing external suppliers’ action on EU internal energy matters passes also through the 
identification of infrastructure solutions. Such as the instalment of reverse flows, permitting to supply the gas 
networks from different alternative sources is a capable step to guarantee the security of supply in times of 
temporary shortages, or in case of regional conflicts that might impact the flow of gas. 
In cases of temporary disruptions of gas flows, close collaboration between EU neighbours is crucial, which is 
also declared in the 2014 European Commission’s Report on short-term resilience in the gas sector [European 
Commission Report on LNG, 2016]. For the oil sector, the Oil Stocks Directive (2009) includes several bonds 
for EU members, to establish in the nearest future the infrastructure needed for stocking crude oil and oil 
products. This step ensures the EU energy market resilience in times of oil supply disruptions. Increasing the 
share of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) supplied by third partners: Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Trinidad, Qatar 
[Noël, 2008] in the internal energy mix is another way to guarantee diversification of energy supply and 
decrease dependence on energy imported from Russia. 
Nowadays, due to high liquefaction, transportation and re-gasification costs, LNG prices on the world market 
are higher compared to pipeline gas. Regardless, a substantial increase of LNG storage capacities in Europe 
and efficient connections linking LNG with the European internal energy network will help to a fall of LNG 
price [DG Energy Report, 2019]. The EU Commission’s LNG strategy heads to increase Europe’s LNG storage 
capacities and to accommodate the regulatory framework [Framework Energy Union Strategy, 2015]. Russia, 
the pipeline hegemony, is a small player on the global liquefied gas market (5%) and focuses mainly on 
diversification of exports towards Asia [Henderson and Mitrova, 2015].  
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However, speaking about LNG in the V4 region, it brings possibilities of supply and route diversification. 
Further, at least two regasification terminals should be able to supply the market: Swinoujscie in Poland’s 
Baltic Sea and the Croatian island of Krk in Adriatic Sea. Both are part of the North-South corridor connecting 
the Baltic and Adriatic Seas through the V4 countries and both will be supported by the EU's funds. EU’s LNG 
Strategy presented in 2016 called for more efficient use of existing LNG infrastructure and gas storage, before 
building new regasification terminals. Nevertheless, the EU has co-financed or committed to co-finance new 
LNG infrastructure projects worth over €638 million for 14 LNG projects, which will increase capacity by 
another 15 bcm by 2021, in addition to the 150 bcm of spare capacity that currently exists” [CEEP First Quarter 
Report, 2019: 11]. For now, all these 14 projects are placed mainly in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Adriatic 
seas. 
Although this is a great opportunity for the region, it also brings risks. The first is the high prices of LNG ports 
and its maintenance, which is difficult to carry for the cash-strapped V4's energy companies [Bralewski and 
Wolanin, 2019]. Swinoujscie, whose cost is around five hundred million EUR, has secured funding from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and from the Polish 
transit company Gaz-System S.A. On October 2012, Gaz-System S.A. signed an agreement with the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a 73.38 million EUR investment loan to be used for the 
development of the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie [Gaz-System S.A. Annual Report, 2012]. The price for such 
a huge infrastructural scheme can grow, mostly due to construction delays. Swinoujscie’s construction has 
already been belated due to the Polish builders stretched by the Euro 2012 soccer cup. If LNG imports would 
partly replace pipeline gas, V4 countries together with Ukraine must search for a new role of their transit 
companies. 
Moreover, another risk is connected to the nature of the LNG market. Similar to the pipeline market, it is 
dominated by long-term contracts linked to oil prices with a strict obligation to import. The contract enclosed 
by the Polish gas company PGNiG with Qatargas covers a ten-year period, uses oil-price indexation, and 
imposes gas intake (1.5 bcm/y) with little regard to demand [Reuters, 2017]. This type of contract secures 
supplies to Poland, but it is a very rigid contract that currently lows Gazprom to push PGNiG to the wall. 
Although Swinoujscie has around 35% of capacity reserved for spot-traded gas, PGNiG may find itself tied to 
another heavyweight supplier. Another dangerous aspect is the LNG market’s dominance by Asia’s demand 
(70% against Europe’s 21% in 2012) and wholesale prices (in Japan they are 50-70% higher than in Europe) 
[DG Energy Report, 2013]. Exporting LNG to Asia is economically more lucrative. 
Another important issue is insufficient demand for the Baltic port. The same applies to new distribution of 
infrastructure in Adriatic Sea. European Union’s gas demand is to increase slightly by 2035 (by 0.6% per year 
on average), the situation in CEE is estimated on being above the EU average [IEA, 2012]. In the V4 countries 
concretely gas has many competitors. Nuclear energy’s share in the Czech, Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Slovak 
electricity mix is above 30% [IEA, 2012], and all V4 countries and Ukraine plan for new reactors in the next 
20 years [IAEA, 2016]. In the same time, Germany brings to the table the proposal of the short-term nuclear 
power and its replacement by cheap coal to supplement the weather-dependent renewables. 
The creation of a free, open and competitive internal EU energy market is impossible without a strong legal 
and regulatory framework. A series of policy tools in this respect is contained within the Third Internal Energy 
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Market Package (2009). Recently, the European Commission is controlling the implementation of the 
provisions of the Third Energy Package. Consistent EU-oriented functioning of national energy regulatory 
bodies is at the core of the Third Package. In the same time, domestic regulatory agencies of member states are 
often oriented towards the defence of national companies. Also, they need to set up capable cooperation with 
energy transmission system operators in order to contribute to the emergence of a truly integrated EU energy 
system. The Third Energy Package institutes the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), whose 
main role is to support national regulator bodies. However, ACER has limited decision-making power, acting 
mainly through recommendations. Regulatory functions at the EU level need to be strengthened and have 
privilege on cross-border issues. The new European energy system’s degree of integration will rely on the 
effectivity of the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-
E/G), established by the Third Energy Package [Framework Energy Union Strategy, 2015]. 
 
Current challenges of the V4 gas market within the European framework 
Recent developments of the European gas market uncovered several threats for energy security that developed 
from crucial changes in production, transit and supply routes of natural gas to Europe. New European gas 
market model is constructed on the principles of diversification, the security of supply, interconnectivity and 
liberalization. It is expected to gran new possibilities and challenges for gas transiting countries in Europe. 
Progressive switch to spot gas markets in Europe will represent fair pricing driven by competition. Moreover, 
change of long-term pipeline supply agreements will bring a high level of volatility and price fluctuations for 
such countries as V4, that lack diversification of supply sources. This situation will force the V4 region to 
search for the new sources of supply. For example, craft reverse supply contracts in the framework of the Third 
Energy Package, finance investments in new transit and interconnection infrastructure and development of 
trading hubs for better matching of demand and supply of gas in the region. These challenges should be 
addressed based on deeper cooperation between the main gas transiting countries in the V4 region, including 
Ukraine. 
During the 90’s Russia had a dominant position on the European energy market with the aim to set up a new 
structure of economic, but also of political cooperation with the EU15, and after 2004 and 2007, with the EU27 
Member States. Russia's economic position on the energy market and its role as a major energy supplier to the 
EU was confirmed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed between the Russian Federation and 
the European Union in 1994 [Yunusov, 2014]. Today, Russia continues to be the main supplier of energy 
resources to the EU, mainly gas and crude oil. Russian gas as a share of primary energy consumption is 
stabilized at approximately 6.5% over the last 25 years [BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015]. Since 
the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia’s share of gas imports to the EU Member States has rapidly fallen, 
from 75% to approximately 45%, showing to the EU example of a successful implementation of diversification 
of supply strategy [Eurostat, 2013]. In 2013, 33.5% of the total EU’s crude oil imports and 28.8% of total EU 
coal imports are imported from the Russian sources [Eurostat, 2013]. Also, the EU is by far Russia’s most 
significant trade partner. 
Data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) show, that most Russian gas imports to Europe are delivered 
through Ukraine and Belarus, and V4 countries. These countries host the largest Russian gas transit pipelines 
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to Europe with a cumulative capacity of 180 bcm or about 70% of the total orders to the EU [Corbeau and 
Yermakov, 2016]. Among them, Ukraine has a strategic position with up to 142 bcm of transit capacity [Bilgin, 
2019]. The V4 region and Ukraine are also important for European energy security as a big holder of 
underground gas storages (UGS). All these five countries together own 36 UGS able to storage almost 50 bcm 
of gas [UN and IGU, 2013]. These storage types of equipment constructed along already established gas transit 
pipelines to Europe and are crucial for levelling off daily gas consumption fluctuations, providing important 
security of supply in case of the sudden cut-off. Also, UGS in normal circumstances serve as an alleviating 
factor in gas pricing by softening seasonal price fluctuations in the gas market and can be understood as an 
important article of spot gas trade, however not the ultimate one. 
V4 region is more dependent on gas from Russia and highlights energy security more than the western EU 
Member States. The Czech Republic has almost no natural gas resources, domestic production (mainly in South 
Moravia) not exceeding 0.2 bcm/y. This covers around 2% of annual demand for gas of the country [Tarnawski, 
2015]. The Czech Republic has the most deregulated natural gas market within the EU since it completely 
privatized the incumbent gas company Transgas in 2002 [Princova, 2019]. As the market was deregulated in 
2006, the company was divided into RWE TransgasNet, the operator of the gas network, and RWE Gas 
Storage, the operator of storage facilities [Langvad, 2017]. The Czech Republic obtained vast flexibility that it 
buys directly from Gazprom only when the contract price is below the German hub price and thus the problem 
of dependency is no longer a real concern.  
Population in V4 region is now more environmentally conscious and hydraulic fracturing has faced aversion 
by local communities. Environmental dangers are introduced as the main reason for a moratorium on both 
exploration and production of unconventional gas in the Czech Republic. In 2012, the Czech Ministry of the 
Environment has announced the moratorium for a period of two years ending in July 2014 [Ministry of the 
Environment, 2013]. Ministry of the Environment is currently searching an opportunity for comprehensive 
legislation on unconventional gas. Estimated deposits of unconventional gas in the country are very universal 
and many projections do not expect production larger than a few percent of the country’s overall consumption. 
Today, about 98% of Czech natural gas is imported (75% of imports come from Russia and the rest from 
Norway), so important local production would be convenient for the country’s energy security [Eurostat, 2019]. 
Own production of gas in Slovakia amounts to 0.15 bcm/y covering around 3% of domestic consumption 
[Tarnawski, 2015]. The rest of the gas is imported from Russia. Although gas transfer and distribution sectors 
were deregulated in Slovakia after 2006, the main importer of gas is Eustream (owned by German E.ON 
Ruhrgas, French GDF Suez and the Slovak Energetický a průmyslový holding - EPH) [Tarnawski, 2015]. 
Eustream is one of the largest transmission system operators in Europe and focuses primarily on the transit of 
Russian gas to Western and Southern Europe. There are two companies operating in the gas storage market: 
Nafta and Pozagas. The major transit networks in Slovakia have four interconnectors with other countries, the 
annual transmission capacity of this pipelines is around 90 bcm/y [Kovács et al., 2011]. Gas from the East is 
transported via Ukraine (Velke Kapusany station), whereas the two main exit points for western-bound gas are 
Lanzhot (on the border with the Czech Republic) Baumgarten (on the border with Austria).  
Shale gas and other unconventional options have not started a vast public debate in Slovakia. Current energy 
policy draft does not introduce possible domestic production of unconventional gas at all [Ministry of 
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Economy, 2013]. British Aurelian Oil & Gas has been exploring for shale in eastern Slovakia, but finally, 
construction did not take place. There are hopes that some shale formation in the south of Poland might overlap 
with Slovakia [European Commission, 2019]. There are also plans for interconnector linking up the Slovak 
and Hungarian networks (between the towns of Velke Zlievce and Vecsés) [Euractiv, 2014]. The 115 km long 
pipeline is to help create the North-South corridor and connect LNG terminal in Poland and Slovakia in the 
future. The capacity of gas storage in Slovakia amounts of approximately 3 bcm/y [Tarnawski, 2015]. 
Hungary has relatively a significant level of local production of gas and, therefore, has some advantage before 
other V4 countries. Domestic gas production covers around 20% of demand of natural gas [Tarnawski, 2015], 
the rest being imported mainly from Russia (apart from gas purchased from Germany and Austria on European 
commodity exchanges). Hungary import Russian gas through Beregdaróc pipeline on the border with Ukraine. 
The gas coming from the European market reaches Hungary via Mosonmagyaróvár on the Austrian border. 
Hungary is also a key transit country for Russian gas sent to South-East Europe (Serbia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, Macedonia) and plans to increase its role in transit. Out of the total flow capacity of the 
Hungarian pipeline network (12 bcm), about 3 bcm is used for transit - the interconnector with Romania works 
since 2010 (Szeged - Arad with the capacity of 3 bcm/y), while the pipeline with Croatia has been active since 
2011 (Városföld - Slobodnica, flow capacity 6 bcm/y) [Tarnawski, 2015]. Hungary also has a high share of 
natural gas in its energy mix (38% in 2010) [IEA, 2011]. Geological surveys suggested shale gas basin suitable 
for drilling. MOL, the largest energy producer in the country, formed a joint venture with ExxonMobil to 
examine options of drilling, but after some unsuccessful examination drilling, ExxonMobil decided to 
withdraw from the project in 2010 [Lehr et al., 2016].  
Poland is one of the V4 countries with the most advantageous projections for unconventional gas deposits, 
even though the latest assessments decreased earlier estimates. It also has a significantly strong gas production 
lobby not only because it depends on the Russian gas (around 9 bcm) [Czekanski, 2019], but also because it 
needs to scale down its greenhouse gas emissions from burning coal, and cheap domestic gas is the best 
solution. The regulation of the Council of Ministers which settles the minimum level of diversification of 
natural gas supplies implements a level of total gas imported from a single source by 2020 at 70% and declares 
a decrease to 33% [Regulation CM, 2017]. This is the reason, why Poland implemented several investments 
concerning natural gas, including the extension of production and distribution infrastructure, the optimization 
of own resources, and the diversification of gas supplies. Projects have been made to widen the country’s 
potential of storing natural gas supplies carried out by sea through the Northern Gate. Apart from plans to 
extend the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie, there were projects planning the construction of the Baltic Pipe, 
successive offshore FSRU installations (Floating Storage Regasification Unit FSRU), as well as 
announcements concerning the construction of small LNG terminal within the port of Gdynia, or the 
construction of a next submarine gas pipeline connecting B-8 oil field with Wladyslawowo [Mietkiewicz, 
2019]. 
Further, Poland awarded over 100 licenses for unconventional gas exploration [U.S. Geological Survey, 2011]. 
Yet, the results are not promising much, and some companies already decided to leave Poland, but that does 
not necessarily mean that drilling in Poland is not commercially feasible. Examples from other countries 
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showed, that it needs constant effort and patience to achieve commercially viable production. Moreover, un-
conventional gas in Poland has in fact very rigorous regulatory framework and high taxation. According to the 
Mining Law of this country, exploration licenses are now granted through state's tenders. 
On the other hand, after the major gas supply cut-off in 2006 and 2009 due to the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
disputes, the V4 countries have essentially strengthened their gas networks and increased interconnectivity, 
both within the V4 region and with the other EU Members States. Poland finalized its main LNG terminal 
project in 2015 (import capacity of 5 bcm/y), thus creating the preconditions to bring a completely new source 
of gas into V4 (Harper, 2019). It also introduced reverse flows on its main transit Yamal pipeline from Russia 
through Belarus to Europe. The Czech Republic and Slovakia did the same on their sections of the Brotherhood 
pipeline through Ukraine. Hungary has built new interconnections with almost all neighbours: Croatia (2010), 
Romania (2011) and Slovakia (2014) (European Commission, 2014). All these investments rapidly improved 
gas system resilience to potential supply disruption and all V4 countries performed infrastructure security 
standards (N-1) [Boersma, 2015]. 
 
Conclusion 
Energy markets in the V4 region are in the process of serious transformation. Gas markets from rigid, 
monopolistic, and rather isolated structures, are becoming more dynamic, competitive and integrated with 
neighbours and the other EU Member States. These variations are primarily visible in the V4 countries and 
Ukraine, but the whole CEE region is slowly following. The main achievement is higher interconnectivity, 
permitting these countries to secure supplies in the crisis. 
The investments to the bi-directional flows on main pipelines, as well as some new infrastructural investments, 
have raised the region’s resilience to potential supply disruptions, but diversification of sources, crucial for 
long term energy security, is still missing. V4 countries must decide how the new infrastructure on the short-
term pricing market will be funded. If these countries and Ukraine have the interest to trade gas with their 
neighbours and keep transporting most of the Russian gas to Europe, they need to invest in reconstruction as 
well as construction of new networks. The significant investment, which can guarantee access to completely 
new gas sources in the V4 region has been the establishment of Polish LNG terminal as well as the Polish 
project of the Northern Gate. By supporting similar projects, V4 countries could establish a regional market 
along with the European Gas Target Model with liquid regional hubs and interconnectors and move towards 
harmonization of national market regulation. Better interconnection of networks could also benefit the 
unconventional gas production. 
Also, the European Commission decision on the OPAL (Nord Stream 1) pipeline put into service in 2011 
(Euractiv, 2016), increased the risk of gas supply distortions to the V4 region and represent a challenge for the 
use of current gas infrastructure as well as the legal constraints. The region should keep beaming on the 
intensification of infrastructure development efforts enabling access of other than Russian gas to the region as 
the key precondition for the functional regional market. Active work on new development of transparent and 
competitive gas storage services, withdrawment from gas market strain measures such as regulation of gas 
prices, the establishment of attractive conditions to invest in generation capacities, transmission and 
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distribution of lines, active involvement in the current debate over new electricity market design, along with 
new renewables and efficiency measures can bring new potential actors and new investments in the future.  
EU-Russia relationships introduce a two-way road, important to observe from V4 countries’ perspective. The 
idea of interdependence is very actual in the diplomatic discourse used by both parts and it means supply and 
transportation of hydrocarbon energy resources from Russia to the EU, in exchange for economic investment 
and transfer of modern technology from the EU to Russia. Security of energy supply and energy demand are 
central issues, underlining the EU-Russia relations. While the EU deals more with the economic aspects of 
Russia’s presence on its energy market, the Russian side traditionally mixes economic and political aspects of 
the energy question. Russia is missing development in real modernization and liberalization of its internal 
energy structure. Despite increasing global energy demand, Russia’s share in the EU energy mix is shrinking 
over the past years. In that regard, V4 countries should support the construction of interconnectors in Ukraine 
and South-eastern Europe by arranging their national energy policies and name EU’s energy targets for the 
next decades. Introducing gas trading at the Ukrainian border with the EU based on Ukrainian and V4 gas 
storage capacities under the Third Energy Package could improve the energy security of the region in the 
future. Development of spot markets to efficiently trade gas could also help because EU’s gas hubs are small, 
less liquid, and partly supplied by the same companies as the long-term traded gas. The V4's trading hub in 
Baumgarten (Austria) serves mainly the gas transit. Such markets can be easily manipulated, especially when 
the number of suppliers is limited. Therefore, finding the right balance between short-term financial and market 
considerations on the one side, and a long-term vision for building a truly integrated and diversified region on 
the other, seems to be the key challenge to keep pace with infrastructural development. 
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